The functioning of economic policy coordination by von Hagen, Jürgen & Mundschenk, Susanne
econstor
www.econstor.eu
Der Open-Access-Publikationsserver der ZBW – Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft
The Open Access Publication Server of the ZBW – Leibniz Information Centre for Economics
Nutzungsbedingungen:
Die ZBW räumt Ihnen als Nutzerin/Nutzer das unentgeltliche,
räumlich unbeschränkte und zeitlich auf die Dauer des Schutzrechts
beschränkte einfache Recht ein, das ausgewählte Werk im Rahmen
der unter
→  http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen
nachzulesenden vollständigen Nutzungsbedingungen zu
vervielfältigen, mit denen die Nutzerin/der Nutzer sich durch die
erste Nutzung einverstanden erklärt.
Terms of use:
The ZBW grants you, the user, the non-exclusive right to use
the selected work free of charge, territorially unrestricted and
within the time limit of the term of the property rights according
to the terms specified at
→  http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen
By the first use of the selected work the user agrees and
declares to comply with these terms of use.
zbw
Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft
Leibniz Information Centre for Economics
von Hagen, Jürgen; Mundschenk, Susanne
Working Paper
The functioning of economic policy
coordination
ZEI working paper, No. B 08-2001
Provided in cooperation with:
Rheinische Friedrich-Wilhelms-Universität Bonn
Suggested citation: von Hagen, Jürgen; Mundschenk, Susanne (2001) : The














Zentrum für Europäische Integrationsforschung
Center for European Integration Studies
Rheinische Friedrich-Wilhelms-Universität Bonn






2001The Functioning of Economic Policy Coordination
by
Jürgen von Hagen
ZEI, University of Bonn, Indiana University, and CEPR
and
Susanne Mundschenk
ZEI, University of Bonn
Mai 2001*
Correspondence






* This is a revised version of a paper presented at the European Commission’s (ECFIN)
workshop on “The Functioning of EMU: Challenges of the Early Years”, 21 March 2001.1
I. Introduction
The beginning of Stage III of Economic and Monetary Union (EMU for short) has brought a
qualitative change in the framework for economic policy making in the member states. The
combination of the single currency and the Single Market creates a unified economic area
in which national borders increasingly lose importance for the economic decisions of
suppliers and consumers. At the same time, however, large parts of economic policy
remain the domain of national or subnational policies. The increasing discrepancy
between the European organization of private economic decisions and the national
orientation of those parts of economic policy that are not directly regulated by the rules of
EMU and the Single Market is the next, important challenge for the development of
economic integration in Europe. The key question is, how national economic policies
should be coordinated among themselves and with the single monetary policy of the ECB.
Economists have analyzed this issue from two perspectives. The first takes the
organization of economic policies at the national level as given and asks, how much
coordination of these national policies is necessary.
1 Coordination is interpreted as a
process of (formal or informal) agreement among independent, national actors. From this
perspective, coordination is the exception to the rule. Economic analysis of this process
identifies conditions that justify the exception, focusing on the existence and magnitude of
international “spill-overs” or policy externalities.
The alternative perspective takes the common economic area as the starting point
of the analysis. Standing in the tradition of the economic theory of federalism, it starts from
the assumption that, in an economic area characterized by trade and factor mobility, the
activities of private economic agents and of economic policymakers are interdependent.
Coordination is the process that makes these activities mutually consistent in equilibrium.
Coordination is a matter of degree and ranges from competition among independent
national or regional authorities to merging such authorities to a supranational one. In this
view, whether or not economic policies should be coordinated in the EMU is not a sensible
question, the proper question is what the best mechanism for coordination in a given field
of economic policy is.
This is the perspective we pursue in this paper. In section 2, we develop our view
in more detail, following a distinction between “club goods” and “national goods” in
economic policy making in EMU. In section 3, we review the existing mechanisms for
policy coordination in the EU and discuss the linkages between them and the club goods
                                               
1 For simplicity, we abstract from the fact that subnational jurisdictions are also involved in the
making economic policy.2
of EMU. In section 4, we turn to the question whether the current framework for policy
coordination promises a sound functioning of EMU. Section 5 concludes.
II. Principles of Policy Coordination
We distinguish two sources of interdependence between national economic policies in
EMU, club goods and horizontal spill overs. The latter are the more conventional ones that
have been dealt with in traditional literature. The first is the more innovative one and is
characteristic for Stage III of EMU.
II.1. EMU Club Goods
We define EMU “club goods” to be economic variables that are shared among all
member states.
2 The first club good is the largely unified, competitive market for goods,
services, capital, and – to a lesser extent – labor. Additional club goods result from the fact
that the members of the euro area share a single currency, a common central bank, and a
common payment system. The price level of the euro area is such a club good. Since a
common currency implies that the price level can reasonably be defined only for the entire
currency area, it is obvious that all EMU members together enjoy price stability or suffer
from the lack of it.
3 In the same vein, low currency risk (reflected in the common level of
long-term interest rates), external balance (reflected in the level and variability of the
exchange rate of the common currency against other currencies), and the stability of the
EMU banking sector and financial markets (reflected in efficient and stable financial
intermediation) are club goods whose benefits accrue to all member states
simultaneously.
The importance of these club goods is best illustrated by an example. Starting from
a macroeconomic equilibrium, assume that a large EMU member state adopts a tax policy
that leads to a slow-down in economic growth and an increase in prices in this country,
e.g., an increase in social security taxes. As a result, the euro-area price level moves
upwards. The ECB will react to this change with an increase in its interest rate. By
assumption, this change will upset the macro economic equilibria in the other EMU
member states. Preserving the quality of the EMU club good price stability in the presence
of national policy actions by one member creates economic costs for the other members.
The point of the example is that the existence of EMU club goods implies a new
channel of externalities between national economic policies. Policies of individual member
                                               
2 The classical analysis of the economics of club goods is Olson (1965).
3 Note that individual countries can experience price developments that differ from the average
inflation rate in the euro area. However, such differential developments must be properly interpreted
as regional relative price movements, which can be expected to be temporary and which cannot be
the subject of EMU monetary policy.3
states that affect policy-relevant euro-area aggregates have economic implications for the
other member states, because the ECB will react to them and this reaction is felt by all
member states. Consequently, it is not enough to look at the direct transmission of policy
impulses between countries, as the traditional literature on policy coordination has done in
the past, to identify the need for cooperative policies in the euro area.
The existence of EMU club goods invites free-riding behavior and discourages
policies that improve the quality of the club goods. Consider a situation of a persistent
external deficit of the euro area, which would lead to a depreciation of the euro in the
longer run. The external deficit calls for a fiscal contraction in the euro area to reduce
aggregate demand. But which member state will take the appropriate steps and cut public
expenditures? As each government has an incentive to wait for others to do so, the fiscal
adjustment will come too late, if at all. As a result, there is not enough collective action to
maintain the quality of the club good of external balance. Generally, governments in the
euro area have weaker incentives to pursue policies improving the quality of the club
goods than governments in national currency systems have with regard to national
economic target variables, as the benefits from doing so fall partly on other governments
in EMU.
4 As in other, more conventional contexts, the club good character of important
economic variables in EMU implies that non-cooperative national economic policies do not
yield efficient policy outcomes.
There are two basic channels through which national economic policies affect the
EMU club goods. The first, obvious one is that some national policies directly affect the
relevant euro area aggregates. As indicated in the example above, this is true for policies
affecting the price level. Policies affecting the common exchange rate and external
balance, and to the extent that the ECB takes euro-area wide economic growth and
unemployment into consideration when setting its monetary policy, policies affecting these
variables are also relevant here.
5 This regards primarily public spending and taxation, i.e.
the macro economic policies of euro area governments. But note that this goes beyond
budget deficits and public debts, the focus of the Stability and Growth Pact, as the level
and the structure of public sector revenues and expenditures have important macro effects
on growth, employment, and prices.
                                               
4 Recognition of this problem with regard to the level of public sector debts and deficits has been
the justification for the Excessive Deficit Procedure of the Maastricht Treaty and the Stability and
Growth Pact.
5 Although the ECB’s main goal is price stability, it has a wider mandate of pursuing the general
economic policies in the community provided that price stability is not endangered. Furthermore,
the policy statements of the ECB clearly reflect a concern with cyclical developments in the euro
area.4
The second channel works through national economic structures that shape the
environment in which ECB monetary policy operates. For example, structural changes
affecting the slope of the Phillips curve or the NAIRU in an individual euro area economy
will change the constraints the ECB faces for its low-inflation policy. As the long-run
equilibrium inflation rate of the euro area depends on such parameters
6, national
economic policies affecting them will have an impact on the common inflation rate in the
euro area. Again, the club good character of price stability in EMU implies reduced
incentives for governments to undertake policies improving the structural environment of
the single monetary policy, if such policies carry political or economic costs in the short
run.
7 The implication is that policy coordination in the euro area does not naturally stop
with macro economic policies (Jacquet and Pisani-Ferry, 2000), but includes structural
policies that affect the performance and flexibility of European markets for goods, services,
and labor.
One might suggest at this point that the EMU club goods call for cooperative policy
making among the larger member states but not the small ones, as policies in the latter
have negligible effects if any on the euro-area aggregates. But this conjecture is
misleading in two ways. First, the adverse incentive effects are larger for the small
countries than for the large ones precisely because the large ones can anticipate the
consequences of their actions on euro-area aggregates and subsequent monetary policy
reactions. Therefore, the larger countries will internalize these effects partly, though not
fully. In contrast, the small countries will not anticipate any such effects and, therefore,
have even weaker incentives to conduct policies preserving the quality of the euro-area
club goods than the larger ones. Second, the small countries together make up about 25
percent of euro-area GDP, i.e., taken together they are not small. The implication is that
one should not limit considerations of policy coordination to the large states.
The need for cooperative policymaking in the presence of important club goods
has, of course, long been recognized in the context of the EU’s first club good, the Internal
Market order (Jacquet and Pisani-Ferry, 2000). Here, new cooperative policies are
developed and proposed by the European Commission, and the proper implementation of
the existing policies is monitored by the Commission and enforced by the European Court.
Internal Market law and its implementation have replaced large parts of national legislation
in the relevant areas in the member states. Furthermore, the process of monitoring and
                                               
6 This is the basic tenet of models of monetary policy based on credibility arguments. See e.g.
Barro and Gordon (1983).
7 See e.g. Sibert and Sutherland (1997), Calmfors (1998) and von Hagen (1999a and b). Saint-Paul
and Bentolila, (2000) show that small reforms may find a higher political incentives within EMU,
since the “There is no alternative” (TINA) strategy lowers the costs in the presence of shocks.5
enforcing the high quality of the club goods involves private agents who have the right to
take legal action against violations of the Internal Market order.
The framework for cooperative policy making with regard to the EMU club goods is
much less developed today. Below, we review the existing policy mechanisms for this
purpose. Here, we state a few principles. An important difference between the Internal
Market and the EMU club goods is obviously that the former consists largely of legal rights
and obligations for private individuals and private and public institutions, while the latter
consist largely of macroeconomic developments. The difference is important, because the
Internal Market club good is a traditional subject of public and private law. In contrast,
economic variables such as “price stability” are difficult to define from a legal perspective,
and the extent to which they are provided by the relevant institutions such as the ESCB is
difficult to assess on a legal basis.
8 Even fervent advocates of monetary policy rules are
unlikely to favor legally binding constraints on monetary policies, as this would leave the
central bank unable to respond to macro economic shocks. The result would be an
undesirable destabilization of output and employment in the euro area.
9 Thus, in the
context of the EMU club goods, cooperative policies will have to rely on a framework that
allows for a more flexible setting of policies.
In principle, cooperative policymaking can have a narrow or a broad agenda in this
context. The narrow agenda would consist of monitoring the national economic policies of
the EMU member states and vetoing policies that are expected to worsen the quality of the
club good. The Excessive Deficit Procedure and the Stability and Growth Pact are
examples for this. The main challenge here is to identify policies that might affect the club
goods adversely and to dissuade member governments from adopting or continuing such
policies. The broad, ambitious agenda would go beyond that and develop cooperative
policies to improve the quality of the EMU club goods.
10
II.2. Horizontal Spill-overs
Traditional analysis of international economic policy coordination focuses on
horizontal spill-overs of economic policy between countries. Spill-overs arise when the
policies adopted by one country have a direct effect on economic variables relevant for
                                               
8 The question whether a central bank should be subject to a legal obligation to keep the rate of
inflation below a certain number has been discussed extensively in the literature, e.g., in the context
of the Reserve Act of New Zealand and the statutes of the ECB. See e.g. von Hagen (1997).
9 See Fratianni, von Hagen, and Waller (1997) for an analysis of these issues.
10 Kenen (1990) distinguishes between a ‘policy optimizing approach’ based on economic analysis
and a ‘regime preserving approach’ which characterizes the practical attitude of governments. The
latter is a no-conflict rule with the purpose of preventing conflicts between national economic
policies and the club goods. The distinction corresponds to our concept of narrow and broad
coordination.6
economic policies in other countries. The focus of the argument is on national targets of
economic policy of the individual member states. Thus, we may speak of “national goods”
in contrast to “club goods”. Here, the transmission mechanisms are based primarily on
quantity effects and international arbitrage. An example for the former is the rise in
aggregate demand in one country due to the rise in another country’s demand for imports
following, say, a fiscal expansion. An example for the latter is a rise in interest rates in one
country following the rise in interest rates in another country due to interest rate parity.
Spill-overs can be positive, as in the case of a fiscal expansion causing aggregate demand
to go up in other countries, or negative, as in the case of a fiscal expansion causing
interest rates to go up in other countries. Note that the existence and relevance of spill-
overs does not hinge on the assumption that countries face similar shocks.
The literature has dealt extensively with such cases, primarily in a context of game
theory (see Hamada and Kawai 1997; McKibbin 1997; and Milner 1997 for comprehensive
reviews). The main idea is that failing to recognize the externalities implied by policy spill-
overs leads to inefficient policy outcomes. Thus, horizontal spill-overs demand cooperative
policymaking among the countries affected by the externalities.
The direction and intensity of such externalities among the euro-area countries is
an empirical question.
11 Existing studies (e.g. in Buti and Sapir, 1998) typically find that
horizontal spill-overs are too small and ambiguous to justify explicit policy coordination in
EMU. However, such results are necessarily based on historical data and misleading,
since monetary integration is likely to lead to new and stronger spill-overs. On the one
hand, monetary integration should intensify trade integration and thus increase positive
spill-overs. On the other hand, monetary integration has created a unified financial market
in the euro area and, hence, increased international asset price linkages.
II.3. Elements of Cooperative Policymaking
According to the Tinbergen paradigm, rational economic policy consists of the
following elements: A set of policy goals, which are first expressed qualitatively (e.g., price
stability) and then quantified in target levels (e.g., inflation rates below two percent
annually), an objective function defined over these goals and the degree to which they are
achieved, a set of instruments available to the policymaker allowing him to move the target
variables close to the desired levels, and an economic model describing the links between
                                                                                                                                              
11 McKibbin (1997) points out that empirical studies of international policy coordination typically find
that the gains from cooperative policies are small. This result, however, comes mainly from
comparing optimal cooperative with optimal non-cooperative policies and from considering policy
settings with no uncertainty. Gains from cooperation can be larger if more simple policy rules are
evaluated or uncertainty is taken into consideration.7
instruments and goals as well as any trade-offs between the goals. Given these elements,
an optimal policy is the solution of maximizing the objective function given the constraints
described by the model.
Consider two countries, j=1,2, each pursuing rational economic policies to reach
three linearly independent national policy goals
12, NGij, i = 1, 2, 3. Each government has a
set of linearly independent policy instruments Ikj , k=1,…, n, available to achieve its goals.
Each economy is described by a model linking instruments and objectives. Figure 1
illustrates the problem of policy coordination in the presence of horizontal spill-overs.
A first point to note here is the role of policy trade offs. If each government had n=3
independent instruments available, it would be able to achieve all three goals fully at the
same time. Realistically, we assume that each government has only two instruments
available, n=2. Consequently, policymaking involves trade-offs between the goals.
Decision making then requires an objective function evaluating this tradeoff and indicating
a most desired combination of instruments and levels of achievement in the three goals.
Figure 1 also shows that the policy instruments of country one have an impact on
the goals of country two, a horizontal spill-over. Non-cooperative policymaking is,
therefore, inefficient. This inefficiency can be overcome by setting policies cooperatively.
Formally, this involves the optimization of the sum of the two objective functions.
                                               
12 The linear independence assumption means that no pair of goals is perfectly correlated.
Figure 1: Policy Cooperation with Horizontal Spill-Overs
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Consider now a situation where the two countries have formed a club and where
the former goal variable i=1 has become the club good. This situation is described in figure
2. As indicated in the figure, the relevant model for the club economy is now an
encompassing one that includes both of the national models. Policymaking in this setting
is more complex for a number of reasons.
Note, first, that policy making would be extremely simplified in this setting if the set
of instruments available to each country had a certain property of separability. Specifically,
assume that the combined instrument I1j , j=1,2, affects only the first goal variable, such
that all remaining policy trade-offs involve the second instrument and the other two goals.
In this case, the countries might create a specialized club agency vested with the power to
use the combined instruments to achieve the first policy goal. The national authorities
would then be able to focus entirely on the remaining goals of national economic policy.
Efficient policymaking would still require cooperative policies among the two countries to
account for the horizontal spill-over. Importantly, however, there would not be a trade-off to
be considered in reaching the desired level of the club good and the desired levels of the
national goal variables. That is, the club authority could be committed entirely to a full
achievement of the first policy goal with no need to evaluate any choices between different
degrees of achieving this and the remaining policy goals at the national level. But note that
this separability would hold before the formation of the club already. That is, one should be
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able to observe that both countries fully reach the first policy goal before the formation of
the club.
This separability is obviously important in the case of EMU. Here, the club agency
is the ECB, which the mandate to pursue price stability as its principal goal without regard
to any other variables. Only if price stability has been achieved, the ECB is allowed - and
required – to consider other policy goals. As we will see below, a framework for
cooperative policymaking among the ECB and the national governments has not yet been
developed. Thus, the current setup of the EMU seems to rely on the assumption that a
separability of the kind described here holds in the euro area (Padoa-Schioppa,1999). But
the fact that price stability was not always achieved before EMU, and that national
monetary authorities formulated their policies in a context of trade-offs between price
stability, unemployment and output growth suggests that the assumption of separability
between monetary policy and other policy instruments available to target the remaining
goals of economic policy is questionable in practice.
 If the separability between policies
does not hold in the way described above, the setting of national economic policies in the
club becomes more difficult. The reason is that the economic constraints given by the
model of the club and the national economies imply a conflict potential between the
national authorities. 
13
A first approach to deal with this conflict potential is to define a joint objective
function over the club good and the national policy goals. The joint objective function
would make the two governments’ valuation of different degrees of achieving the policy
goals explicit and, therefore, its construction would require a political bargaining process.
Optimization of this joint objective function would then yield optimal values for all national
policy instruments (and the instruments of a club authority, if it exists.) This optimization
would simultaneously solve the horizontal externality problem. 
14
A second approach is to give the club good preeminence over all other goals of
economic policy and require full achievement of the associated goal regardless of the
achievements in other policy dimensions. As in the case of the ECB, this preeminence
could be institutionally underpinned by creating a special club agency vested with
sufficient instruments to achieve this goal and independent from the national governments.
Its independence would assure that the club agency would pay no attention to other policy
                                               
13 The existence of such a conflict potential has been recognized by the Luxembourg Council in
1997 which concluded that “…To the extent that national economic developments have an impact
on inflation prospects in the euro area, they will influence monetary conditions in that area. It is for
this basic reason that the move to a single currency will require closer Community surveillance and
coordination of economic policies among euro-area Member States.”10
goals unless the first goal had been fully achieved. Such an approach appears attractive at
first glance, because it does not seem to require a political agreement regarding the
valuation of trade-offs between the club- good and the national policy goals.
Preeminence of the club good, however, only moves the conflict potential between
the national policy goals and the club good to a different level. To illustrate this, assume
that the first government, because of a large negative shock to its target variable NG21
wants to increase the use of instrument I21 and that this has a damaging effect on the club
good. Suppose that maintaining the desired level of the club good requires either a
reduction of the second government’s use of instrument I22 or a response by the club
authority that affects both countries negatively. There are now three outcomes: (1) The
first government renounces the use of I21 and, thus, implicitly accepts a lower degree of
achieving NG21. (2) The first government increases the use of I21 and the second
government reduces the use of this instrument, i.e., it implicitly accepts a lower degree of
achieving NG22 . (3) The first government increases the use of I21 , the second government
does not react, but the club authority does, causing a lower degree of achieving the other
policy goals in both countries. Any choice between these three outcomes (or convex
combinations of them) involves a judgment of the fair distribution of “welfare” among the
two countries. This is equivalent to optimizing a joint objective function defined over the
policy goals of both countries that takes a full achievement of the goal connected with the
club good as given. The outcome of such an optimization would be less efficient than that
of optimizing a joint welfare function, as it amounts to a constraint optimization. As long as
there is a non-zero correlation between the club good and the national policy goals,
judgements regarding the implied trade-offs or the distribution of costs across the club
members cannot be avoided.
The analysis so far has assumed that the club provides only one club good. Above,
we have identified several club goods in the context of the EMU. The existence of several
such goods further complicates the situation, as trade-offs between these club goods must
be considered in addition to the trade-offs between them and the national economic policy
goals. One implication is that the approach of giving one club good preeminence over all
other goals of economic policy will only work if the provision of all club goods is strongly
positively correlated. A related implication is that the creation of a single club agency
charged with the provision of the first club good will not guarantee a satisfactory provision
of the other club goods. In the context of macroeconomic policies, this is the well-known
problem of the policy-mix (Jacquet and Pisani-Ferry, 2000). One way out of this dilemma
                                                                                                                                              
14 Dixit and Lambertini (2000) provide a simple model of the Barro Gordon type for horizontal
externalities that allows also for some sort of monetary and fiscal policy interactions using two11
would be to charge the club agency with the task of providing all club goods in satisfactory
quantities. But this would require the club agency to evaluate trade-offs between them and
make choices accordingly; a task that would be too demanding for an independent
agency. Thus cooperative policymaking is required among the members to assure a
satisfactory performance of the club.
The essence of this discussion is that cooperative policymaking in the context of a
club good requires a decision making framework that contains the following elements:
• A framework of analysis (a model) linking policy instruments and policy goals at
the national level and the level of the club;
• A framework for evaluating the degree of achievement of policy goals and for
evaluating trade-offs among them (an objective function);
• A procedure for deriving optimal instrument values at the national and the club
level (a collective choice mechanism).
One might object to this analysis that it relies too much on optimizing economic
policies, an unrealistic assumption in practice. The literature on cooperative policymaking,
however, has shown that the gains from cooperation are even larger when governments
follow policy rules that are simpler than those implied by full optimization (McKibbin, 1997,
von Hagen, 1993). Importantly, the conflict potential implied by trade-offs between the club
good and national policy goals is not removed by simplifying economic policies.
What, if the club members cannot agree on such procedures? In the absence of a
club agency charged with producing and maintaining the club good, this would lead to
permanent underprovision of the latter. The result would be a poor performance of the club
that would undermine its stability. Thus, the creation of a club agency is an essential step
in setting up a club with no or little cooperative policymaking. But note that this suffices
only in the presence of a single club good. With multiple club goods, underprovision of
some of them would still be the consequence.
With a club agency, the club would enjoy a high level of provision of the club good,
but this might come with more or less unsatisfactory degrees of achievement regarding the
national goals of economic policy. Each member state would optimize its economic
policies given the level of club good provision delivered by the club agency, and each
member would have to accept that it could not do any better than that. This could well be
an acceptable outcome as long as no individual member engages in policies that impinge
heavily on the club good and force the club agency to react in ways inflicting significant
costs on the other members. Thus, even in the absence of cooperative policymaking, the
                                                                                                                                              
policy objective functions with different weights for the goals for ECB and national authorities.12
functioning of the club requires mechanisms of “narrow cooperation”, i.e., rules that
prevent club members from imposing economic costs on others.
Furthermore, individual club members in such a scenario have incentives to
engage in structural policies – changing properties of their economies reflected in the
parameters of the economic models – that improve the outcomes of their policies with
regard to their national policy goals given the provision of the club good by the club
agency. In fact, this is often regarded as an attractive aspect of such a scenario, as the
lack of cooperative policymaking would create competition among the members and this
competition would improve the performance of the national economies.
15 Ex ante,
however, it is not at all clear what such reforms would imply for the ability of the club
agency to deliver the club good. Again, a framework of “narrow cooperation” would be
required to prevent such developments.
The situation would be more difficult, if a member state were hit by a large shock,
the adjustment to which had significant adverse consequences for the other members,
while not adjusting to it was politically and economically very costly and would call the
country’s club membership in question. Some cooperative action would then be required.
While this suggests that one could leave cooperative policymaking to times of crises, it
would still be necessary to develop a framework for exceptional cooperation that would
contain all the elements mentioned above and a mechanism for identifying and declaring
crisis.
Individual rationality suggests that no member would have joined the club expecting
this outcome to be worse than staying outside the club. Thus, although the absence of
cooperative policymaking yields worse results than cooperative policymaking, it should still
be better than not forming the club at all, and it should be viable in normal times, i.e., the
absence of large shocks. Still, the power of the reference point of staying outside the club
is likely to vanish as the club grows older. Over time, therefore, it is likely that the demand
for more cooperative policymaking increases.
III. Mechanisms for Policy Coordination in the EU
The purpose of the following section is to describe the existing processes of policy
coordination. We discuss how they relate to each other and in what ways they differ. We
then identify obstacles in the present EU network of coordination procedures with respect
to existing club goods.
                                               
15 As shown by Oates and Schwab (1988) and Sinn (1997), however, the analogy of competition on
private markets and competition among governments is not as simple as the popular argument
suggests.13
Prior to the start of monetary integration, policy coordination in the EU was based
on two main methods, harmonization of policies based on common rules of behavior and
delegation to Community institutions (Jacquet and Pisani-Ferry, 2000). The administration
of the Internal Market and Common Agricultural Policy are prime examples for delegation,
where the authority over common policies was given to Community institutions. The
coordination of monetary policies within the European Monetary System was an example
for rule-based coordination among national authorities. EMU has added further examples
of coordination based on these methods. The conduct of the single monetary policy by the
ECB is an obvious example for delegation. The fiscal strictures of the Excessive Deficit
Procedure and the Stability and Growth Pact are examples for rules-based coordination in
EMU. But in addition to these traditional methods of coordination, the Maastricht Process
and the development of the Union during the 1990s have introduced new ones that are
based on dialogue, the exchange of information, peer pressure and persuasion.
III.1. Actors
According to the Treaty (Art. 99), member states coordinate their economic policies
at the EU level within the Council of Ministers with the participation of all 15 member states
and the presence of the European Commission and the ECB where deemed necessary.
The Council of Economics and Finance Ministers (ECOFIN) is the relevant one for the
discussion and decisions about government deficits, spending, and taxation, while the
Employment/Social Affairs Council deals with employment and social policies. In the
coordination procedure established by the Treaty (Art. 99), the Council adopts policy
guidelines and recommendations by majority voting on a proposal from the Commission,
thereby following the conclusions of the European Council - the Heads of State or
Government of the 15 member states and the highest level of coordination. Although the
title of ECOFIN suggests otherwise, it is noteworthy that the members of this body are far
from being a homogeneous group, as the functional and the political role of finance
ministers varies considerably across EU member states.
The 1997 European Council in Luxembourg agreed to the establishment of the
Euro group, now known as the Euro12-Group, of the finance ministers of the EMU
member states, in recognition of the specific coordination requirements among participants
of the euro area. Since the Euro Group has no legislative responsibility, its role is to
assess the economic situation and to discuss the major policy issues for the euro area. It
is chaired by a minister of a participating EMU member state, including in periods when
the EU presidency is held by a non-EMU member. This subgroup of ECOFIN gathers in
connection with ECOFIN meetings.14
The European Commission is present both at ECOFIN and Euro12 meetings. The
Commission has the right for initiatives in Council meetings and to provide analysis for
multilateral surveillance. The Economic and Financial Committee (EFC) has advisory and
preparatory functions for the Council meetings. It consists of representatives of national
administrations and national central banks, as well as two representatives of the European
Commission and the ECB. Within the limits set by the consensus agreements of the
national governments, both institutions, the EFC and the European Commission have
played leading roles in the development of the coordination process, e.g. by proposing the
various procedures reviewed below. While the European Commission and the EFC cover
macroeconomic and financial issues, the Economic Policy Committee (EPC), which
consists of officials from economics ministries, concentrates on structural policies.
16
According to insider views, the European Council and ECOFIN can hardly be
regarded as effective institutions for cooperative decision making. Padoa Schioppa (1999)
argues that ECOFIN is too large of a forum to develop concrete policy actions or policy
rules. Furthermore, it involves too many participants and catches too much media
attention to facilitate confidential discussions and deliberations.
17 The more informal
Euro12-Group allows a more concentrated debate, since national delegations are
restricted to two persons. However its role is limited since decisions can be taken only at
the Council level. Jacquet and Pisani-Ferry (2000) argue that the Euro12-Group has
played a useful role in developing the quality of economic policy debates among its
members, but that the role of this group is largely exhausted with this function.
Art. 113 forms the Treaty basis for a dialogue between the Council and the ECB. It
foresees the participation of the ECB in Council meetings where matters relating to
monetary policy are discussed. In turn, the Council president has the right to participate in
meetings of the ECB Governing Council and to submit motions for deliberation by the
Governing Council. But since the president of the EU Council represents all members of
the EU, he is not necessarily a good counterpart for the ECB to discuss the policy mix in
the euro area. This is partly recognized by the practice that, if the EU presidency falls on a
non-euro state, the Council president is represented by the chairman of the euro group,
i.e. the finance minister from the next EMU member state to hold the EU presidency. The
ECB president is always invited to participate in meetings of the Euro12 -Group.
In a study based on surveys of the national central banks and finance ministries,
Bini-Smaghi (2000) finds that the quality and frequency of the dialogue between Council
                                               
16 Under to the Lisbon strategy, structural policies should gain more prominence on the policy
agenda.15
and ECB are lower compared to the dialogues between the national finance ministries and
the central banks before the start of EMU. As long as national finance ministries regard
their policy as a matter of national concern, the reduced information exchange reduces the
incentive to internalize the ECB’s reaction and therefore leads to insufficient coordination.
Table 1: The annual EU Procedures and actors involved
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17 Italianer (1999) states that because of the abundance of accompanying officials the focus of
attention has shifted towards the twice yearly informal meetings of ministers of finance and central
bank governors which often managed to give decisive political impulses to the EMU process.16
III.2. Processes
Table 1 presents an overview of the processes of policy coordination in the context of
EMU. They include the Broad Economic Policy Guidelines, the process of multilateral
surveillance, the Excessive Deficit Procedure and the Stability and Growth Pact, the
Luxembourg, the Cologne, and the Cardiff process.
III.2.1. The Broad Economic Policy Guidelines
The Broad Economic Policy Guidelines (BEPGs) form the center of economic
policy coordination process at the Community level in accordance with Art. 99 of the
Treaty. The BEPGs consolidate the different existing processes (Luxembourg, Cologne
and Cardiff, see below) and aim at exploiting the synergies between them. BEPGs also
form the reference for the multilateral surveillance procedure, under which the consistency
of national economic policies with the BEPGs and the functioning of EMU in general are
monitored. The multilateral surveillance procedure includes the possibility to make
confidential or public assessments of the policies of individual member states and to give
confidential or public recommendations to their governments. The European Council
decides by unanimity vote on the BEPG upon proposals by the European Commission and
recommendations by ECOFIN.
The BEPG do not sufficiently recognize the existence of club goods in the euro-area
that are not shared by non-EMU members of the EU. Thus, they do not constitute a proper
framework for developing the macroeconomic policies to be adopted by the EMU member
states to secure a proper policy mix. When the European Commission considered EMU
matters explicitly in the BEPG 2000, Council ministers including some EMU members
objected that distinction. When the BEPG for 2001 did not distinguish between EU and
EMU in its analysis, some of the same Council members claimed that such a distinction
would have been useful. This example suggests that the process of policy coordination is
still in flux.
In the BEPG for 1998, 1999 and 2000 responsibility with respect to the club good
‘price stability’ was assigned not only to monetary policy but also to national fiscal policy
by recommending that countries in which inflationary pressures were building up (Ireland,
Spain and Portugal) should rely on fiscal policy to avoid overheating. Moreover, the BEPG
include recommendations for the behavior of the social partners. It is unclear, however,
whether or not the bodies developing and discussing the BEPG can make commitments
on behalf of the social partners in the member states and secure the implementation of
this part of the guidelines at the national level.17
III.2.2. Procedures for the Control of Fiscal Deficits and Debts
Fiscal policy remains a national competence for EMU member states, but under
several constraints. EMU Procedures for the conduct of fiscal policy are the Excessive
Deficit Procedure (EDP), the Mutual Surveillance Procedure (Art. 99, 100, 111 TEU), the
Stability and Growth Pact (Regulation 1467/97). The No-Bail-Out-Rule (Art. 103 TEU, Art.
21 ESCB Protocol) protects member states from becoming responsible for financial
liabilities of other member states against their will. The Excessive Deficit Procedure
includes the mandate (Art 3 of the Protocol) that the member states of EMU should
implement appropriate institutions at the national level that enable them to fulfill their
obligation to maintain sustainable finance. In contrast to the obligation for all member
states to have independent central banks, there is, however, no explanation of what this
obligation means in practice.For members of the EMU, the EDP is an unconditional
obligation to avoid excessive deficits. In addition, the SGP calls for medium-term
budgetary positions close to balance or in surplus. The higher the debt-to-GDP ratios of
the country, the greater must be their efforts to reduce them rapidly. Member states are
required to take immediate corrective actions, if they are found to have an excessive
deficit. The EDP and the SGP allow for the imposition of financial sanctions in such cases
– a feature that distinguishes these from other coordination procedures.
In this context, EMU members are required to produce annual Stability programs
that present the main fiscal decisions and budgetary choices on the path to the medium
term objective for budgetary positions close to balance or in surplus (2001-2004 for the
latest programmes). The Council considers whether the budget-policy strategy and the
economic targets continue to meet the requirements of the SGP and the BEPG. In order to
prevent the occurrence of excessive deficits, the Council may give an early warning in line
with Article 99(4) of the Treaty.
While the combination of the EDP and the SGP acknowledge the importance of
fiscal discipline for the conduct of monetary policy, it is still unsatisfactory with respect to
the EMU club goods for several reasons.
• First, the procedure focuses on individual member country performance with no
regard to the aggregate fiscal policy stance of the euro area as a whole. Implicitly,
it is based on the assumption that being close to balance is unconditionally the
proper contribution of fiscal policy to macroeconomic stability in the euro area.
While this may be true in the long run, conventional macroeconomics hold that
stability demands different constellations of monetary and fiscal policy at different
stages of the business cycle.
• Second, it focuses narrowly on deficits and debts and ignores the policies that
affect the common exchange rate and external balance as well as the contribution18
of fiscal policies to growth, employment and prices, such as the level and structure
of public spending and taxation. In the context of policy coordination, the emphasis
of the EDP and SGP on government borrowing is justified only if one assumes that
national fiscal policies affect the EMU club goods and cause horizontal spill-overs
predominantly through their capital market effects.
• Third, the EDP and SGP are designed to prevent countries from running excessive
deficits that are defined in terms of fixed, numerical thresholds. No guidance is
provided, however, for the member countries’ fiscal policies in times when the
numerical limits have been achieved. There is now ample evidence showing that
problems with non sustainable public finances are typically the result of policies
that allow a small number of spending items to run out of control (e.g. Perotti,
Strauch and von Hagen, 1998). The recent reemergence of fiscal laxity in the EMU
member states (see von Hagen, Hughes-Hallett and Strauch 2000) is consistent
with that experience. It suggests that the rules for fiscal policy do not do enough to
guide fiscal choices in good times and prevent the emergence of excessive
deficits.
Within the existing framework for policy coordination, the place for formulating and
monitoring the achievement of such objectives would be the BEPG. It is interesting,
therefore, to note that the Commission’s and the Council’s recent recommendations for
more fiscal discipline in Ireland were made under Art 99.4 (BEPG), although the analysis
was made in the context of the SGP (Fisher and Reitano, 2001). Thus, there seems to be
some recognition of the incompleteness of the framework for fiscal policy coordination
provided by the EDP and the SGP. But the weaknesses of the BEPG for policy
coordination in the EMU context also suggest that the potential for using them for the
purposes indicated above is limited.
III.2.3. The Cologne Process
Under German Presidency, an informal macroeconomic dialogue known as the
Cologne Process was introduced. It institutionalized a bi-annual informal process of
consultations between public authorities and representatives of wage bargainers without
setting objectives. The dialogue discusses technical macroeconomic issues on a national
level and reports them subsequently for a political exchange between the ECB, ECOFIN,
the Labor and Social Affairs Councils, the Commission, and the social partners. ECOFIN
is represented by the ‘troika’ of the past, current, and subsequent presidencies. The social
partners are represented by their respective organizations at the European level.
The Cologne Process aims at improving the interaction between wage
developments and monetary, budgetary and fiscal policies in order to achieve stronger19
growth and higher employment while maintaining price stability. Although the dialogue
explicitly considers the necessity of wage policies at the national level to be consistent with
the EMU club good of price stability, the forum is unlikely to play a major role in the
coordination process. This is due to the fact that the EU federations of trade unions and
employers unions do not have the authority to represent a common view of the respective
partners in all the different member countries and, therefore, cannot assure the
enforcement of any agreements on guidelines for wage policies at the national level. This,
in turn, is due to the institutional heterogeneity of social partner organizations in the
member countries (See OECD ,1996).
18 There is nevertheless a role for improving the
information content for fiscal, monetary and wage policy making in the presence of
common price level as our club good.
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III.2.4. The Cardiff and Luxembourg Processes
 According to a popular view, EMU membership should increase the willingness of
governments to undertake politically inconvenient reform policies, as this is the only
remaining policy tool to deal with asymmetric shocks. However, Sibert and Sutherland
(1997), and Calmfors (1998) argue that reform incentives for member states can be less
than outside EMU, as monetary policy no longer eases costly reforms in the national
context and the benefit of one country’s reform will be spread to all members of the euro
area. In light of these arguments, the Luxemburg and Cardiff processes may be seen as
attempts to reinforce reform incentives for member states via peer pressure. In addition,
the two processes aim at improving employment and the functioning of the Single Market.
The Cardiff process monitors structural reforms and innovations of member states
in product, capital and labor markets. In this process the Economic Policy Committee
plays a leading role as it conducts a multilateral surveillance (Synthesis Report).
Instruments used are peer pressure and an extensive reporting, monitoring and evaluation
system. In accordance with the Lisbon strategy, more emphasis has been put on the
identification of best practices. The Cardiff Process is now linked to the Single Market
Report. Its relies on the concept of competition between different jurisdictions and aims at
abolishing barriers to the free movement of goods, services, capital and labor. In 2000,
quantitative indicators were developed by the Commission to improve the assessment in
this area.
                                               
18 Wyplosz (1999) argues that further centralization at EU level is also hindered by the diverging
labour costs throughout Europe where in Germany labour costs are five times larger than in
Portugal.
19 Collignon (2001) emphasizes that the underlying philosophy of the Macroeconomic Dialogue is to
structure a debate in Europe where relevant policy information could be shared in a consensus
building way.20
The Luxembourg process was launched at the end of 1997 and reinforced by the
inclusion of the Employment Chapter (Title VIII) in the Amsterdam Treaty.
20 The
Luxembourg process aims at building a coherent approach to actively dealing with
structural labor market problems in EU countries. The purpose is to improve the
effectiveness of national employment and labor market policies by better focusing on
problem groups, by improving the set of instruments, and by establishing a continuous
evaluation process. The four ‘pillars’ and 22 ‘guidelines’ serve to guide labor market and
employment policies and as a basis for the assessment of country activities.
The Treaty sets up a framework for an annual multilateral surveillance procedure
similar to the multilateral surveillance procedure of Art. 99 and in some aspects goes even
further than that by giving the Council the possibility to adopt incentive measures.
Specifically, the disbursement of monies from the European Social Fund has been made
conditional on the member states’ compliance with the Luxembourg process.
Even a short glance reveals a lack of substantial foundation of the pillars and
guidelines of the Luxembourg Process. For example, the employment benefit from active
labor market policies comes from addressing specific market failures. They can improve
overall employment performance, if they are targeted specifically at individual market
failures. Therefore, policies cannot be simply translated from one country to another, an
implication, which is not explicitly considered in the current evaluation process. These
fundamental weaknesses probably reflect a more basic problem of the Luxembourg
process, i.e., the absence of a truly European employment problem. A review of the
individual labor market performances shows that some countries have achieved full
employment, while others have not. Among the latter, some countries have predominantly
regional unemployment problems (Italy and Germany), while others have problems with
specific social groups, which may be age-related (youth unemployment in France) or skill
related (e.g., in the UK).
The practical experience with the process so far has shown that monitoring labor
market policies across countries is not an easy task. The Luxembourg process demands a
common evaluation of the ‘input’ and ‘output’ of active labor market policies. The definition
and use of common indicators is complicated by the prevalence of different statistical
conventions and different institutional settings which imply that the same indicator can
mean very different things in different countries.
                                               
20 The Treaty recognizes that member states retain the principal responsibility for employment
policies. Nevertheless, Art. 125 calls for the development of a coordinated employment strategy by
the member states and the Community, and Art. 126 calls upon the member states to contribute to
the objectives of this strategy through their employment policies, to regard promoting employment
as a matter of common concern, and to coordinate their actions in this regard.21
As a result, the impact of Luxemburg Process for its main objective employment
creation is less clear given different structural problems of the member countries. The
process may nevertheless have an impact on reform incentives of member states and
therefore affect the EMU club good. However, the main actors involved in the process are
the Ministers of Labour and Social partners who may not account for the implications of
their choices for the quality of club goods in this context. Thus, the process accounts
insufficiently for the interaction between labor market policy and other policies.
IV. Effectiveness of Policy Coordination
 In this section, we go back to our analysis to assess the effectiveness of these
procedures in light of the exigencies for coordination in EMU. Several criteria can be
derived from our analysis: the scope of cooperative policymaking in the EMU, the ability to
face trade-offs and make choices between relevant policy alternatives, the ability to
commit policies at the national level, and the quality of the analysis within the processes.
IV.1. Scope of Cooperative Policies
Our review of the existing procedures at the EU level shows that the scope of
cooperative policymaking is broad even today, much broader in fact than a traditional
reading of the concept of economic policy coordination in the EU context would lead one
to expect.
21 The policies covered by the existing processes range from budgetary policies
over labor market policies to regulatory policies at the national level. This is consistent with
our view that cooperative policymaking should include policies that affect the environment
and the constraints of the common monetary policy in EMU. Still, the existing procedures
do not cover all relevant aspects of the broader policies involved, as in the case of the
level and structure of public spending, although the Commission makes visible efforts to
broaden the assessment of public finances in this regard (e.g. Commission, 2000).
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Nevertheless, there are significant limitations of the scope of cooperative
policymaking. A first one is the fact that the existing procedures do not address all the
different club goods of the EMU explicitly. A partial exception is exchange rate policy,
which is at the center of the coordination between monetary and fiscal policies. Art. 111
TEU foresees that the EMU members of ECOFIN can decide, by qualified majority,
following a recommendation of the ECB or the European Commission, and if price stability
                                               
21 As discussed in Harden and von Hagen (1997), the term ‘economic policy’ has traditionally been
interpreted to mean mainly budgetary policy.22
is not endangered, on general exchange rate policy orientations. This creates an
opportunity for cooperative exchange rate policies, albeit outside the ordinary processes
described above. However, clear rules and procedures for such cooperation in case of
reduced quality of the club good – exchange rate stability or misalignments - are missing.
A viable alternative would be a framework that would allow the Council to respond to
signals coming from the exchange markets on the basis of an analysis of the Commission
and the ECB (Jaquet and Pisani Ferry, 2000). For the current-account club good no
provisions are foreseen in the Treaty, although the Treaty has provisions for Community
assistance in the case of an individual member country facing severe external imbalances.
Similarly, the current processes pay no attention to the club good of financial market
stability.
Another, significant limitation in the scope of cooperative policymaking is that the
current procedures focus entirely on ex-ante coordination. That is, the participating
countries (and the ECB, where applicable), reveal what they intend to do given their
expectations about future economic circumstances. What will happen, if these
expectations fail to materialize, however, is not part of the various procedures. This
limitation is particularly important in the context of coordination between monetary and
fiscal policy in the EMU, where the development of transparent rules for cooperative
reactions to shocks could greatly help guide private sector expectations, which in turn
largely determine the outcomes of macroeconomic policies.
IV.2. Ability to Face Trade-offs and Make Relevant Choices
Above, we have shown that EMU creates the need for formulating trade-offs between its
club goods and between these and the national goals of economic policy. The current
procedures for cooperative policies do neither make room for that nor for making the
relevant choices. On the one hand, the processes are rather compartmentalized in terms
of policy fields, while the analysis and evaluation of trade-offs requires dealing with more
than one field of policy at a time. On the other hand, such an analysis and discussion
currently only happens in the context of the BEPG. Yet, the specificity of the BEPG and
the analysis surrounding them generally seems rather low (Pisany Ferry, 2001). For
reasons stated above, the EU Council, the relevant decision making body in this context,
does not seem to be the appropriate body for a detailed assessment of trade-offs and
policy choices.
                                                                                                                                              
22 The Lisbon Council has asked the Commission to develop a concept of “Quality of Public
Finances” as a broader framework and to evaluate the connection between public finances and
economic growth.23
The difference between EU and EMU matters particularly in this regard. At the
level of the EU, the Internal Market constitutes the principal club good. As in pre-EMU
times, the coordination of economic policies is deemed important in this context to assure
that countries do not engage in policies that undermine the smooth functioning of the
Internal Market – competitive devaluations being the traditional example. The euro area,
however, has a broader need for policy coordination. Fears among the non-EMU members
of the EU, that closer and more intensive policy coordination among the EMU states might
have adverse consequences for their own competitive positions in the Internal Market
have, so far, been an obstacle to the design of more effective processes.
The lack of a practical equivalent of what economists call an objective function of
economic policy leaves the process of policy coordination in a vulnerable and risky state. It
implies that there is neither a framework nor a forum to discuss in depth and detail choices
between different degrees of achievement of different policy goals at the EMU and the
national level and the distribution of costs of policy adjustment at the national level to
achieve a good overall performance of the EMU. The implicit assumption of this setup
seems to be that a competitive process of policy coordination, i.e., one in which each
country does all it can to pursue its own goals at the national level given a common
monetary policy and the Excessive Deficit Procedure, serves to guarantee the best
performance of the EMU under all circumstances. There are good reasons to believe that
this assumption is incorrect.
Elsewhere, we have argued that the quality of economic policy in the EMU could
be greatly improved by the creation of an Economic Policy Council, an improved version of
the Euro Group. With an appropriate institutional design, such a council would enhance
policy coordination by developing judgments about policy trade-offs and the distribution of
adjustment costs. It would be a significant step to overcome one of the most critical
shortcomings of the current framework for economic policymaking in EMU.
IV.3. Ability to Commit
Effective policy coordination requires the possibility to commit the participants to
some joint program of action or common policies. However, the current set-up for
cooperative policies in the EMU relies essentially on peer pressure and persuasion. This is
a direct result of the fact that the EMU member states were unwilling to give up further
sovereignty over their economic policies or a lack of consensus (Collignon, 2001).
Experience with this approach in the EMU and in other contexts suggests that the
responsiveness of governments to peer pressure is not the same in all countries. Large
countries in particular are less likely to react to peer pressure in the desired way, as the
wish to be “good European” typically plays a much weaker role in their domestic politics24
than in smaller countries.
23 The slippage in fiscal discipline observed in 1999 and 2000
and the fact that France and Germany undertook significant tax measures without referring
to them in their Stability programs (European Commission, 2000) support the impression
that the effectiveness of peer pressure to secure commitment is limited.
Furthermore, the procedures for cooperative policymaking do not always involve
the relevant actors at the national level. This implies that negotiations in the individual
processes often can lead to no more than statements of good intentions to persuade the
other actors relevant at the national level. Experience suggests that these good intentions
do not always lead to good results.
The institutional preconditions are another relevant issue here. Recent empirical
studies of fiscal practices in the EU states show a large degree of variation in the
implementation of fiscal rules (Hallerberg, Strauch and von Hagen, 2001; Fischer and
Reitano, 2001). In some states, the fiscal targets formulated in the context of the Stability
Programmes are translated into detailed targets at the level of individual ministries, and
the governments have developed a detailed framework enabling them to keep their
budgetary aggregates close to the stated targets when revenue or expenditure shocks
occur. In other states, the connection between the targets stated in the Stability
Programmes and the annual budget process is loose and rules for shocks do not exist.
This suggests that the effectiveness of the EDP and SGP as a framework for policy
coordination varies across countries. On the other hand, the political economy of fiscal
policy shows that the suitability of fiscal targets and multiannual programs to guide a
government’s fiscal choices and serve as a commitment device depends on political
factors such as the organization of government and electoral systems (Hallerberg and von
Hagen, 1998). Given the variance of these factors across EU member states, the strong
reliance of the EMU on this approach is questionable.
This is also true for the connection between national decision making processes
and the processes at the European level. The writing of the Stability and Growth Programs
does not typically coincide with the annual budget cycle in the member states. Member
states are required to supply their programs before March 1 but agreed to submit these
programs before the end of the year. In all countries except the UK, the annual budget
cycles start in the fall with the final budget being adopted by the Parliament towards the
end of the year or early the following year. How can objectives in the programs and the
Council opinions feed back into the national budgetary process and implementation? A
late submission, after the adoption by the parliament, may not incorporate the relevance of
                                               
23 It is interesting in this context to note that, during the convergence process to EMU in the 1990s,
the small EU countries were much more responsive to the pressures for adjustment of budgetary25
the budget on EMU level. This might reflect the strategic choice of that country to avoid a
parallel debate at EU and national level but is inefficient with respect to our club good.
Given that the aggregated fiscal stance is relevant for the assessment of the
macroeconomic policy stance within the euro area, the missing link in the two debate
favors the national positions.
IV.3. Quality of Analysis
Policy coordination requires a common framework of analysis showing how
macroeconomic developments respond to various types of shocks and to the use of policy
instruments at the national and the European level. With regard to the macro economy of
the euro area, the sheer fact that EMU is a new entity explains the current lack of such a
framework. Researchers at the ECB, the Commission and elsewhere are developing such
models. It should be noted, however, that the existing procedures for policy coordination
also involve a large amount of analysis of the effectiveness of economic policies at the
national level, e.g., active labor market policies in the context of the Luxembourg process.
Currently, such analysis is mainly provided by the national governments, and seems to be
driven by considerations of political opportunity rather than value of information. There is
clearly a need for improvement in this context.
The surveillance of national economic policies and the formulation of credible
recommendations require high quality of the relevant statistical information. For example,
the effective monitoring of the public finance positions requires information on an on-going
basis during the year (Jaquet and Pisani Ferry ,2000). Or, an improved data set on active
labor market policies may allow identifying successful labor market strategies across
countries within the Luxembourg process. There is still a need for improving the quality
and availability of data needed in the existing processes.
The acceptance of peer pressure by member states relies on the methods of
analysis used to formulate recommendations. For example, the set of relevant fiscal
indicators have to be broadened in order to allow a qualitative assessment of the
respective policy stance. A better quality information is also needed to assess the member
states performance in conducting structural reforms. Finally, the criteria for the selection of
“best practices” particularly in the Luxembourg and Cardiff Processes, which are used as
benchmarks for the member states’ own practices are far from obvious. These criteria
should be spelled out explicitly to assure that the selected cases of “best practice” are
adequate for guiding the member states policies.
                                                                                                                                              
policies than the large countries. See von Hagen, Hughes-Hallett and Strauch 2000.26
V. Conclusions
EMU has created a new environment for economic policy in Europe. It is
characterized by the existence of multiple club goods. In this paper, we have explored the
implications of this new setup for economic policymaking in Europe, and reviewed the
current processes for policy coordination.
The existing framework is a half-finished house at best. Its greatest vulnerability
stems from the lack of an explicit recognition that EMU involves trade-offs both at the
aggregate level and between aggregate and national goals of economic policy. These
trade-offs require policy choices and create distributional conflicts regarding the cost of
adjustment at the national level to ensure a proper functioning of the EMU as a whole.
One might argue that this lack of a more developed framework for policy
coordination does not matter much in times of benign economic circumstances and that
the member states will find and adopt a solution when times become more difficult in the
future. But such an approach bears significant risks: Experience shows that governments
want to see quick results in times of crises and that policies adopted under time pressure
often turn out to be costly but hard to reverse in the long run. Ultimately, therefore, a wait-
and-see attitude is not in the interest of the member states.
It is advisable, therefore, to use the current, favorable circumstances to develop a
more complete framework for cooperative policymaking in the EMU. The relevant agenda
includes assigning responsibilities and strengthening commitment at the national level,
developing a framework for presenting and making the relevant policy choices, improving
the quality and the transparency of the processes and the analysis, and developing rules
for responding to shocks. Given the reluctance of the national governments to engage in
that process, the European Commission should have an interest to take the initiative in
this regard. One must recognize, however, that the evaluation of policy trade-offs and
distributional conflicts is inherently a political task. The Commission, in its role as a
guardian of the proper functioning of the EU and a promoter of further integration should
call upon governments to engage in this process and its development. As a non-elected
body, however, it is ultimately not in the position to make the necessary decisions itself.27
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